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Abstract
We implemented the first web-based online field experiments of fund-raising. We embedded
our experiment in the Internet Public Library to test four mechanisms: Voluntary Contribution
(VCM), Premium, Seed Money and Matching. Although the gift size is not significantly differ-
ent across mechanisms, the Seed and Matching mechanisms each generate significantly higher
user click-through response rate than the Premium mechanism. Because this is one of the earli-
est embedded, web-based field experiments, we report our methodology findings in some detail.
Cookies work better as participant assignment techniques than pop-up windows and elicitation
of geographic information. Participant clickstream data that nominally demonstrate a desire to
donate is a poor predictor of actual giving.
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Voluntary contributions to support activities with public goods characteristics is an
important economic activity. Individuals in the U.S. gave $188 billion dollars in
2004 (Giving USA 2005). Scholars have studied the motivations for individuals to
make voluntary contributions since the 1960s. More recently, there has been atten-
tion to the design of fund-raising campaigns in order to elicit higher contributions.1
The emergence of the Internet has introduced both new public goods that need
funding, and new opportunities for raising funds. An enormous amount of informa-
tion is freely provided over the Internet, and electronically-distributed information
is a near-perfect example of a public good (nondiminishable and nonexcludable).
Examples include reviews (of, e.g., books, movies, appliances, former romantic
partners), data (e.g., economic, political, sociological), literature, non-fiction trea-
tises, maps, directories and so forth. The creation, collection, organization, storage,
indexing, presentation, revision and other functions of an information service all
are costly, even when electronic reproduction and distribution cost approximately
zero at the margin.
Simultaneously new opportunities for soliciting and collecting voluntary con-
tributions are made available by the low-cost, wide-area, increasingly ubiquitous
communications network provided by the Internet. Fundraisers can implement both
targeted and diffuse direct e-mailing campaigns at much lower cost than traditional
direct mail campaigns.2 More novel is the ability to embed a contribution system
directly in the information delivery mechanism. For example, when a user goes to a
Web site to obtain a freely provided document, a button can be provided right next
to the document labelled “Donate!”, and the button can be programmed to present a
relatively simple and immediate electronic funds transfer form, e.g., for a real-time
verified credit card transaction.
During the early years of the public Internet (largely the 1990s) there was an
explosion of voluntarily-provided information resources. The costs were born by
altruistic individuals and organizations who seeded creation and initial operations.
However, more and more providers of public information goods have discovered
that they need to secure new sources of ongoing funding to support maintenance
operations, as well as continuing investments in creation and organization of new
material. Thus, interest in effective Internet-based fund-raising mechanisms has
grown rapidly at the same time that the scholarly community has been focusing on
the more general question of fund-raising mechanism design.
In this article we report on a field experiment to test four different contribution
mechanisms incorporated directly into a major Internet information service. The
1Usually volunteer-supported public goods are underprovided, so at the margin increasing con-
tributions is likely to increase efficiency.
2The Howard Dean presidential campaign drew much attention for the success of its online
fundraising. During the first three months of campaigning Dean raised nearly half of his $7.5 million
total through online donations, using a commercial fundraising system (Convio) for nonprofits that
allows organizations to implement several of the mechanisms we describe in this paper (Weiss 2003).
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four mechanisms are the voluntary contribution mechanism, voluntary contribution
with premiums, seed money and matching mechanisms (detailed below). The ex-
periment was run on the Internet Public Library site.
The Internet Public Library (http://www.ipl.org) began as a graduate seminar
project at the University of Michigan School of Information in winter 1995. It pro-
vides two major services: a subject-classified and annotated collection of materials
and links on a wide range of topics, and question-answering reference service. In its
ten years of operation, live reference experts have answered over 50,000 questions.
In the most recent calendar year (2004) there were about 7.5 million unique visitors
and 12.4 million separate visits.3 Dozens of articles have been written about IPL,
and awards received. Several observers conclude that the IPL is “perhaps the largest
and most well known” of the free electronic reference and online library collection
services (McCrea 2004).
The IPL has been supported by miscellaneous in-kind donations from technol-
ogy companies, funding from the University of Michigan, and volunteer labor. No
ongoing sources of regular funding have been established. Hegenbart (1998) con-
cluded that without regularized funding, the IPL’s “economic viability is in jeop-
ardy.” This real long-term funding need of the IPL motivates our study.
In our study, we designed a natural field experiment (Harrison and List 2004)
to test the effectiveness of the four fund-raising mechanisms. We implemented the
mechanism by modifying the IPL web site and instrumenting it to track user interac-
tions. To our knowledge, this is the first embedded field experiment which studies
fund-raising mechanisms on the Internet. A natural field experiment provides a
bridge between a laboratory experiment and direct field observations. It allows us
to study behavior in a more natural environment than the lab with participants who
are the actual users of the site. Meanwhile, it gives the researcher more control than
field observations as we can randomly assign users to different mechanisms and
keep all aspects of the environment constant across mechanisms except the descrip-
tion of the mechanism itself. (See Harrison and List (2004) for a comprehensive
discussion and classification of field experiments.) In recent years, there have been
an increasing number of fund-raising field experiments. List and Lucking-Reiley
(2002) study the effect of seed money and refunds in a university capital campaign
and find that both mechanisms are effective in increasing contributions. Eckel and
Grossman (2005) compare the effects of rebates and matching mechanisms in a
public radio fund-raising campaign. They find that matching mechanisms result
in larger total contributions compared to their strategically equivalent rebate mech-
anisms. Rondeau and List (2005) report results from a fundraising campaign to
finance an expansion of an environmental education program of the Sierra Club
in Canada. They find that announcement of challenge gifts considerably increases
campaign contributions, while matching gifts do not have a significant effect on the
3Private communication with Prof. Maurita Holland, IPL Executive Director.
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average and total donations. While all three studies use direct mail and manipulate
the payoff structure faced by individual donors, Shang and Croson (2005) manip-
ulate social information during an on-air fund-raising campaign for a public radio
station. They find that the most influential social information is the information
drawn from the 90th to 95th percentile of previous contributions. Our study differs
from the above in both the context and the medium of implementation. As this is
the first online fund-raising field experiment, we discuss our methodological find-
ings in detail. We hope that both the success and pitfalls in our methods will guide
future online field experiments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1 we review the lit-
erature on the mechanisms we test. Then, in Section 2 we detail our experimental
design, with particular emphasis on the problems associated with implementing the
experiment online, and the technologies we used to address these problems. We
present our results on the economic hypotheses in Section 3, then discuss our find-
ings on the methodology for online experiments in Section 4. We summarize our
conclusions in Section 5.
1 Fund-raising Mechanism Design
Charitable fund-raising is a sizable industry, spending more than $2 billion per year,
with a strong strategic focus (Andreoni 1998). Potential donors are presumed to
respond to incentives, and to have concern for whether other potential donors will
contribute enough to make a program viable. Thus, scholars have treated fund-
raising as a problem for game theory and mechanism design. There is now a sizable
theoretical and empirical literature.
We implemented four known mechanisms: a voluntary contribution mecha-
nism (VCM), seed money (leadership giving), matching, and premium. In a VCM,
donors contribute to a public good with no guarantee on the total amount that will
be raised, and with no direct private return, although of course the donor can obtain
private utility from the public good that is provided. The standard problem is an
application of the theory of public goods (Samuelson 1954); for a recent review see
Andreoni (2006 (forthcoming). The fundamental result is that from a social point
of view, contributions will be inefficiently low.
Leadership giving or seed money is widely used by professional fundraisers.
The charity secures initial donations, ideally of an unusually large amount, from
prominent donors. Such gifts might be expected to encourage free-riding by other
potential donors, but seed money can help avoid an inefficient equilibrium if there is
a nonconvexity in the production function for the public good: a minimum thresh-
old that contributions must meet or surpass before any benefits of the public good
can be consumed (Andreoni 1998). For example, a new university sports facility
cannot be constructed unless at least $75 million is raised. In such a model there
are generally two sets of Nash equilibria. The first set is inefficient, consisting of
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any combination of contributions which do not reach the provision point and no
one can unilaterally increase her contribution to reach the provision point. The sec-
ond set is efficient, consisting of any combination of contributions which add up to
exactly the provision point and the fund-raising campaign is successful. The seed
money is to encourage other donors to believe that the threshold will be met.4 List
and Lucking-Reiley (2002) recently tested the effect of seed money by manipulat-
ing an actual capital campaign at the University of Central Florida, and found that
increasing the seed money as a percent of the goal increased the participation rate
and had a more than linear effect on the total donations. Increasing the amount of
seed money, however, has two opposite effects on public contributions. On the one
hand, it might function as a credible signal of the quality of the charity (Vesterlund
2003); Potters et al. (2005) provide experimental evidence to support this hypoth-
esis. Leadership giving might also increase total donations when individual utility
functions exhibit warm glow or snob appeal effects (Romano and Yildirim 2001).
On the other hand, increasing the seed money in a threshold public goods environ-
ment decreases the aggregate amount of money actually required from the general
public. To partition these two effects, List and Rondeau (2003) conduct laboratory
experiments and find that announcing leadership contribution has sufficient value
to eliminate the negative effect created by the implicit reduction in threshold.
Another mechanism is matching: a benefactor commits to match donations at
some fixed rate. The mechanism is sometimes used directly by a particular cam-
paign (in a different context corporations sometimes offer to match employee dona-
tions to any recognized charity, rather than just one specific campaign). Matching
subsidies are at least sometimes more costly to leadership donors than seed money,
and in general they would optimally be offered only in conjunction with seed money
(Andreoni 1998). The U.S. government uses a type of rebate mechanism for many
types of giving through giving a charitable donation deduction on personal income
taxes, though the experimental evidence from the laboratory suggests that people
respond differently to tax deductions and matching funds (Eckel and Grossman
2003). In a field experiment which closely parallels their lab experiment, Eckel and
Grossman (2005) find that matching mechanisms induce larger total contributions
to the charity than their strategically equivalent rebate subsidies. The price elastici-
ties are about one and one half to three times as large for the matching mechanism
compared to the rebate subsidy. In a recent field study, Rondeau and List (2005)
compare the matching mechanism with the seed money mechanism, and find lit-
tle evidence that the former has a positive effect on charitable contributions. Seed
money, on the other hand, significantly increases campaign contributions.
A third well known mechanism is to offer donors some sort of premium, which
is an award or prize correlated with the gift size. For example, a charity might
give donors a coffee mug for a modest donation and an umbrella for a larger gift.
4This model and the equilibria is closely related to the provision point mechanism (Bagnoli and
Lipman 1989).
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Performing arts organizations often give special treatment to different categories
of donors (e.g., ticket priority and special dinners with visiting performers). In a
related study, Andreoni and Petrie (2004) investigate the effects of publicity and
categorization of gifts (without premium). They find that announcing donors by
gift size category did not increase the total amount of giving in an experimental
study, but did have a substantial effect on the distribution of gifts. Donors shifted
the gift amounts toward the lower bound of a category, typically giving less if they
otherwise would have been in the lower half of the category, and giving more to get
into the next category if they were otherwise in the upper half of the category. In
our experiment, we give gifts as premia, with cash values that are larger for larger
categories of giving; such premia might be expected to have a greater incentive
effect than merely announcing the names of donor by gift size class.
2 Experimental Design
We designed a web-based field experiment using the Internet Public Library (IPL)
as the platform to test the effectiveness of various fund-raising mechanisms pro-
posed in the literature. We compare four mechanisms, the voluntary contribution
mechanism (hereafter shortened as VCM), voluntary contribution with premiums
(Premium), seed money mechanism (Seed) and matching mechanism (Matching).
We use VCM as the control, and Premium, Seed and Matching as treatments. We
compare the participation rates and the average gift size for each mechanism. This
is the first online fund-raising experiment, and also one of a relatively small number
of online field experiments embedded in production information systems. There-
fore, we are also interested in users’ behavioral responses to various design features
(such as the use of pop-up and pop-under windows, and side-bar buttons), and mea-
surement issues (such as the interpretation of clickstream data).5
We conducted two campaigns. The 2004 campaign started on 4 October 2004,
and ended on 6 January 2005.6 The 2005 campaign ran from 20 April through 6
July 2005. While the texts of the soliciting messages of the four mechanisms were
the same across the two campaigns, we modified the techniques used for the random
assignment of participants, and the design of the alerts that invited participation.
5We attempt to consistently use the term “user” to refer to a person who came to use the IPL
website, but may or may not have chosen to participate in some portion of the field experiment. We
use “participant” to refer to those users who through some affirmative action choose to participate
in at least part of the experiment, where the smallest degree of participation would be entering
requested postal code information, or clicking on one of the campaign buttons or links to view the
campaign solicitation messages.
6We had intended to end campaign on 30 December 2004. However, due to the holiday break,
the campaign was not removed until 6 January 2005.
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2.1 Campaign 2004
We had two goals for the assignment of participants to mechanisms. Our first goal
was to balance the population characteristics assigned to each of the four mecha-
nisms, especially the three treatment mechanisms.7 The second goal was to ensure
that each participant observes one and only one soliciting message throughout the
entire campaign. While this latter goal can be easily accomplished in a conven-
tional mail or phone campaign, it is much harder in an online environment because
of limited mechanisms for identification and authentication of participants.
To achieve the first goal, we opened a pop-up window when the user first
reached the IPL website, in which we asked for the first three digits of the user’s
postal code (see Appendix A for a screen shot), which we then used to demographi-
cally balance the treatments. To achieve the second goal, we decided to use cookies
to create persistent identities for participants. We now explain these technologies
and our use of them to implement our experimental design. In Section 4 we discuss
the behavioral responses by users, and the lessons we learned for embedded online
experimental design.
2.1.1 Postal Code Pop-Up Window
We first address our technique for balancing the size and demographics of the treat-
ment populations through the use of postal code geographic identifiers and census
demographic data by geography.
When users came to the IPL site for their first visit during the campaign, they
were asked to enter the first three digits of their postal codes in a pop-up window.8
We conjectured that this information is relatively low-cost and non-invasive for the
users. We specifically wrote the text in the pop-up window so that there is no
indication it is connected with fund-raising, or an experiment (see screen shot in
Appendix A). We checked the (partial) postal code information against a database
of American and Canadian postal codes. Users who entered legitimate postal codes
were randomly assigned to one of the four mechanisms. If the entry was not a
legitimate postal code, or if the user ignored the pop-up window (entered nothing),
she was allocated to the benchmark mechanism (VCM). Users from other parts of
the world were also assigned directly to VCM. The IPL staff estimate that roughly
80 percent of its users come from the United States and 3-4 percent from Canada.
7Balancing the assignment of participants to treatments based on observable characteristics that
are suspected of being correlated with the behavior under examination is the preferred technique
in experimental design since the seminal work of R. A. Fisher (Fisher (1920), Cochran and Cox
(1957)).
8A pop-up window is a new browser window that appears on top of the user’s current window,
and that can be created by the software code embedded in a website when triggered by a specified
user action. In our software, connecting to the IPL triggered code to evaluate whether a user should
be shown the pop-up window, and if so, to create the window.
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This assignment method insures that the population characteristics assigned to each
of the three treatment mechanisms is balanced, at the cost of a more varied set of
characteristics in users assigned to VCM.
For participants from the United States, we adopt the system of three-digit codes
that represent ZIP Code Tabulation Areas (ZCTAs) developed by the U.S. Census
Bureau for tabulation summary statistics from Census 2000. We then designed
an algorithm to categorize all three-digit codes of ZCTAs into four groups so that
the variation in population size, urban and rural population, average household in-
come and median household income were as small as possible across mechanisms.9
Furthermore, as philanthropic attitudes and behaviors are likely to be correlated
with socio-cultural characteristics, which, in turn, might be correlated with geo-
graphic areas, we use the definition on geographic regions adopted by the Bureau
of Economic Analysis (BEA), which group the states into eight regions, i.e., Far
West, Great Lakes, Mideast, New England, Plains, Rocky Mountain, Southeast,
and Southwest. According to the BEA, the grouping was based on the homogene-
ity of states with respect to income characteristics, industrial composition of the
employed labor force, and noneconomic factors, such as demographic, social, and
cultural characteristics. We assigned the ZCTAs of a specific BEA region to the four
mechanisms as equally as possible so that the population from any BEA region was
not over-represented in any of the four fund-raising mechanisms.
Table 1: Population and Household Income Distribution by Mechanism in the
U.S.
Total Pop. Urban Pop. Rural Pop. Agg. Household Median Househ.
Mechan. (millions) (millions) (millions) Income (billions) Income (thous.)
VCM 71.4 57.5 13.9 148.4 39.2
Premium 71.2 56.2 15.1 152.0 39.8
Seed 71.2 56.2 15.0 150.5 40.1
Matching 71.4 56.1 15.3 150.1 39.9
Table 2.1.1 summarizes the population and income distribution by mechanism
in the United States. As shown, all the population and income variables roughly
follow a uniform distribution across mechanisms. The assignment of population
across the BEA regions is also uniformly distributed across the four mechanisms.10
We assigned Canadian participants in a similar manner. The form of Canadian
postal codes is “ANA NAN”, where A is an alphabetic letter and N is a numeric
9The first three-digits of a zip code do not excessively localize populations (the first three dig-
its might be shared by a city of more than 150,000), and in any case we assign many different
three-digit aggregations to each mechanism, with the selection of which three-digit codes based on
balancing the observable demographic averages to ensure that we are not selecting for homogeneous
populations.
10Tables are available from the authors upon request.
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character.11 Our software checks the three digits participants enter in the pop-up
window with the FSA codes in the database to identify Canadian postal codes. We
used the first letter to randomly group Canadian participants by province/territory,
for which we obtain statistics on the distribution of population and income from
Statistics Canada (2001). In Table 2.1.1 we present our aggregate assignment of
Canadians by population and earnings across mechanisms.
Table 2: Population and Earnings Distribution by Mechanism in Canada
Postal Code Total Rural/Total Earnings Per Capita
Mechanism Initial Pop. Pop. (in Canadian $)
VCM A,T,Y 3,516,411 23% 18,449
Premium C,E,G,H,J,S 9,081,204 24% 16,780
Seed B,R,V,X 5,999,433 22% 17,848
Matching K,L,M,N,P 11,410,046 15% 20,697
The proportional assignment of U.S. and Canadian participants to the four mech-
anisms was designed to ensure that IPL users assigned to each mechanism share the
same income and rural/urban residential distribution as the entire population. To
achieve this goal, we needed users to enter their postal code information truthfully.
2.1.2 Cookies
A significant problem for our experimental design was the difficulty in identifying
repeat visitors to the IPL so that we could ensure a participant received the same
experimental treatment each time. This is a special concern for online experiments.
Many web-based information services, especially those provided as public goods
(IPL included), do not require users to identify or authenticate themselves. The IPL
staff wanted us to not create an identification system that required users to create
accounts and login for the experiment because they expected this would adversely
affect usage and public satisfaction with the IPL service. Therefore we needed to
devise another method to implement identification.
Identification requires that a user offer a unique identifier, such as a registered
login name. Authentication is a process that verifies the proffered identity, to in-
crease the confidence that the user proffering the identify is actually the owner of
that identity. Authentication might also be used to ensure that a user can proffer
only a single, unique identity. There typically will be problems for experimental
11The first character of a postal code represents a province or territory, or a major sector entirely
within a province. The first three characters identify the Forward Sortation Areas (FSAs) that are
associated with a postal facility from which mail delivery originates.
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design if multiple different participants offer the same identity, or if a single user
returns to the experiment and offers a different identity than the first time.
Because we could not create a system to require active identification (e.g., a user
account with login), we implemented a passive method for creating identities and
authenticating them. Our method is reasonably reliable when users do not have a
strong motivation to interfere with the system (e.g., there is no monetary gain from
breaking the authentication system). This method uses cookies.
When a user visited the IPL for the first time during the campaign period, we
not only solicited postal code information but also tried to write a cookie on the
user’s machine. We did this to create a persistent identity for participants, so that
we could ensure that the same mechanism was presented to a participant each time
he or she returned. A cookie is a small file that a website can request a browser
to store on the user’s local computer; the browser will comply unless the user has
configured it to reject cookie creation requests. Our software generated a unique
identifier to store in a user’s cookie, and also stored this identifier in our database
on the IPL server. Then, each time a user connected to the IPL, we checked to see if
that user already had a cookie, and if so, to which treatment it had previously been
assigned.12
If a cookie was written successfully, we created an observation in our database,
in which we stored an assigned record ID for the participant, the mechanism ID
associated with the campaign message shown, a time stamp when the participant
actively clicked to “Contribute now”, and other information related to the partici-
pant’s online activities at the IPL. If a participant returned to the IPL at a later time,
we read the cookie on her machine, and identified her in the database. Return users
were not shown the postal code window again, and would be shown exactly the
same campaign message as on the first visit.
If we were unable to write a cookie on a user’s machine, we did not create a
record in the database, since we could not create a persistent identifier for the user.
In addition, these users were not automatically shown the campaign solicitation
message. If the user affirmatively clicked on one of the campaign buttons or links,
she would be shown the VCM message. We are aware that assigning users who
reject cookies to VCM might lead to a biased sample. For example, if users who
reject cookies tend to be technically more savvy, which, in turn, might be correlated
with certain demographic characteristics, the population characteristics of users in
VCM might be different from the treatments. However, the alternative of random
assignment of these users to all four mechanisms leads to a more severe problem.
12The cookie system provides a modest amount of authentication, as well: the cookie is stored
on the user’s account on the computer, and thus, is only accessible to our software when someone
is logged into that user’s account, so we effectively piggyback on the login system for the user’s
computer to provide authentication. Our technology does not authenticate that participants have and
use only one unique identity; for example, we do not have a way to recognize a user at home and
the same user at the office as the same person.
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Since we cannot identify these users, they could be assigned to a different mecha-
nism each time they visit. We view the latter problem as being more severe than the
first. Therefore, we assign these users to VCM.
We used cookies to complement the postal code volunteered by participants to
ensure that each user would be shown only one mechanism. Without cookies, we
would have to rely on users to enter (the same) postal codes every time they came
to the IPL. This method would greatly increase the risk that some users would
be exposed to multiple mechanisms (due to intentional or unintentional entry of
different or illegitimate codes). Participants identified by cookie would see the
same mechanism, even if they did not provide the correct postal code information
at the first visit.
2.1.3 Reaching the Solicitation Message
There were three ways that a participant could be presented with a campaign solic-
itation message: automatically in a pop-under window; by affirmatively clicking a
“Friends of IPL” button displayed on the left side of the IPL homepage; or by affir-
matively clicking a small horizontal link labeled “Friends of the IPL” and present
at most of the IPL subject pages.13 A pop-under window appears behind the user’s
current browser window, and thus is visible after the user exits the IPL and closes
her main window. The use of a pop-under window to display the solicitation mes-
sage automatically was suggested by the IPL staff. The use of a pop-under rather
than pop-up window avoids interrupting a user’s activities. The fund-raising spe-
cialist we consulted also argued that the best time to catch users’ attention was after
they closed the IPL pages, presumably happy with the information obtained from
the IPL. In Appendix A we present screen shots of the “Friends” button, and the
three screens of the fund-raising appeals.
Screen 1 offers a brief introduction, and then explains the particular fund-raising
mechanism to which the participant is assigned. Participants were invited to make a
pledge and informed that their gifts would be tax-deductible. Since one third of the
IPL patrons are school children, a note states that one needs to be 18 years of age or
older in order to make a contribution. Participants could contribute by clicking on
the “Contribute Now” link in the lower right corner of screen 1. Alternatively, they
could proceed to screen 2, which includes information on the deadline, suggested
amount of gifts and a web link to information concerning the Michigan State tax
credit.14 Participants could then choose to contribute by clicking on the “Contribute
13The IPL has many subject pages, such as Arts & Humanities, Business, Computers, Education,
Entertainment, Newspapers, KidSpace, and TeenSpace. Some users bookmark one or more of the
subject pages, and enter the subject pages directly rather than through the IPL main page. We put a
horizontal link of “Friends of the IPL” on every subject page except KidSpace and TeenSpace.
14Residents of Michigan could elect to receive the full value of their contribution, up to $200 per
taxpayer, as a tax credit, rather than deduct it as a charitable contribution; a deduction is worth less
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now” link, or could go back to screen 1. The “Contribute now” link on both screen
1 and 2 will took participants to screen 3, the first page of the University Giving
website, where detailed instructions were provided in a vertical frame of the screen,
as shown in Appendix A. One could choose to contribute by writing a check or
using a credit card online. After entering the University Giving page, we were
unable to track participants further due to constraints imposed by the University
Giving office. We did receive a weekly report from the University Giving office
that showed for each donation received the amount contributed, the donor zip code
information, and a time stamp indicating the second when the contribution was
completed.
While participants can view the campaign messages for as many times as de-
sired by clicking on one of the “Friends” buttons or links, our software would only
display the message automatically via the pop-under window once per day, to avoid
overload users. This was requested by IPL staff. In addition, we coded participants
who had clicked on the “Contribute Now” button as contributors, and we displayed
no further fund-raising appeals automatically.
2.1.4 Campaign Messages
The complete solicitation messages for all four mechanisms are in the Appendix B.
Each of the four messages start with the same common introduction paragraph of
the IPL, and end with the same paragraph, “Making a gift is easy, greatly needed
and appreciated, tax-deductible, and directly supports the IPL service you use. Let
us welcome you now as our newest IPL Friend!” Each message differed in the
description of the particular mechanism.
In VCM, users are invited to make a contribution today, with the baseline de-
scription of “Our goal is to raise $20,000 by December 30, 2004, to cover a portion
of the annual operational costs of the IPL.”
In Premium, small gifts with the IPL logos (mouse pads, book lights and CD
cases) were offered to donors according to the size of their gift. We displayed the
following message: “Our goal is to raise $20,000 by December 30, 2004, to cover
a portion of the annual operational costs of the IPL. All Friends contributing $25 or
more will receive a special IPL thank you gift:
• IPL mouse pad ($25-$49)
• IPL book light flashlight ($50-$74)
• IPL CD case ($75 or above)”
than a credit because the participant recovers only her tax rate times the amount of the contribution
(or less if she has high enough adjusted gross income that the limits on itemized deductions are
active).
11Chen et al.: Online Fund-Raising Mechanisms
Small images of the premium gifts are also included in screen 1 of the appeal.
In Seed, with the help of the Development Office at the School of Information,
University of Michigan, we were able to use an anonymous donation of $10,000 as
the seed for this campaign.15 The corresponding message is thus, “Our goal is to
raise $20,000 by December 30, 2004, to cover a portion of the annual operational
costs of the IPL. We’re already half way there with a gift of $10,000! Won’t you
help us with the final $10,000? Your gift in any amount will make a big difference.”
Similarly, in Matching, the Development Office enabled us to offer one-for-one
matching, to a total of $10,000. In the message we described this: “Our goal is to
raise $20,000 by December 30, 2004, to cover a portion of the annual operational
costs of the IPL. To help us get there, an anonymous donor has agreed to match
contributions, $1 for $1, up to a total of $10,000. Double the impact of your gift
and join the IPL Friends today!”
The total amount of targeted gifts was equivalent cross four mechanisms. There-
fore, in VCM and Premium, the goal was set at $20,000, respectively, whereas in
Seed and Matching, we set a goal of an additional amount of $10,000, respectively.
In all mechanisms, although gifts of any amounts are welcome, we suggest that
the participant consider “a gift of $25, $50, $75, $100, or $365.” This technique is
common practice in the fund-raising community.
Based on previous theoretical and experimental research, we expect that each of
the three treatment mechanisms, Premium, Seed and Matching, will induce higher
contribution amount and gift size than VCM. Because of the lack of robust empirical
evidence on the ranking of the three treatment mechanisms, our null hypothesis is
that they will perform equally well in terms of contribution rate and gift size.
2.1.5 Campaign Re-design
The 2004 campaign was launched on October 4, 2004. However, our original exper-
imental design yielded a skewed distribution of online traffic, since the vast majority
of the users did not enter a valid U.S. or Canadian postal code. As a result, they were
directed to the VCM, which thus had a much higher number of participants than the
other mechanisms. We subsequently revised the user assignment to alleviate this
problem. The revision was put into production on November 10, 2004. Under the
revised software, rather than sending all users without a valid U.S. or Canadian
postal code to the VCM, these users were randomized among all four mechanisms.
Users who entered valid U.S. or Canadian postal codes were still presented with the
message based on the original design.
15Because this was a field experiment, in which users were making real donations without in-
formed consent, all elements of the campaign had to be truthful, so we could not announce seed
money unless the money was actually obtained as part of the campaign. Therefore, as part of our
experimental design, we actually needed to obtain the $10,000 in seed money, and the $10,000 in
matching money described below, in order to test these mechanisms.
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Even though the pop-up window was designed to appear unrelated to fund-
raising or an experiment, and for the second half of campaign 2004 and all of cam-
paign 2005 all users were treated the same, we do not rule out the possibility that
there might be a sample selection bias from the different handling of those who
complied with the pop-up window and the much larger number who did not.
2.2 Campaign 2005
Campaign 2005 was launched on April 20, 2005 and ended on June 30, 2005. We
revised the assignment of users to mechanisms based on lessons learned from the
2004 campaign.
The major revision made was to eliminate all pop-up and pop-under windows,
including the zip window and the pop-under window with fund-raising messages,
as they were not effective in the 2004 campaign (see Section 4 for a discussion of
the problems we encountered with pop-up windows).
In the new design, a user would see a campaign message only when she volun-
tarily clicked on the campaign button on the IPL home page or the small horizontal
campaign link located on each of the subject pages (again, except the KidSpace and
TeenSpace). Users were assigned to each mechanism randomly and uniformly. No-
tice that we no longer could control the demographic balancing of our treatments,
and thus we rely entirely on randomization for this balancing.
Cookies were again used to track users, so one user could see only one message
consistently. Users who participated in the 2004 campaign were again identified
through their cookies and shown the the same message they had seen in 2004. Users
whose computers did not allow cookies were assigned to VCM.
The solicitation messages were largely the same, except for two minor updates.
First, we changed campaign ending date from December 30, 2004 to June 30, 2005.
Second, the introductory paragraph was revised slightly to incorporate the 10th
anniversary celebration of the IPL.
On the IPL homepage, we use a new button that presented a logo with the text
“Make an anniversary donation” (see Appendix A). The small campaign link on
each of the IPL subject pages was made more prominent. Other design features of
our experiment remained the same as for Campaign 2004.
3 Results
We raised a total of $1,128 from 24 different individuals, $903 in the 2004 and $225
in 2005. We now analyze contribution rate, gift size, and click behavior. By way
of comparison, in a recent seed money fund-raising experiment List and Lucking-
Reiley (2002) raised $5509 from 183 donors through a direct mail campaign for
Central Florida University, for an average donation of $30. We obtained a smaller
sample of contributors, but an average donation of $47.
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Table 3: Contribution Rate by Mechanism
Mechanism #Users saw screen 1 # Contributors Contribution Rate (%)
Alll Data 2004All 2005 2004All 2005 2004All 2005 Combined
VCM 122,573 1,564 14 1 0.01 0.06 0.01
Premium 6,921 1,568 3 1 0.04 0.06 0.05
Seed 7,090 1,529 1 1 0.01 0.07 0.02
Matching 7,281 1,514 1 2 0.01 0.13 0.03
Total 143,865 6,175 19 5 0.01 0.08 0.02
Post Red. 2004Red 2005 2004Red 2005 2004Red 2005 Combined
VCM 2,269 1,564 4 1 0.18 0.06 0.13
Premium 2,304 1,568 1 1 0.04 0.06 0.08
Seed 2,322 1,529 1 1 0.04 0.07 0.05
Matching 2,423 1,514 0 2 0.00 0.13 0.05
Total 9,318 6,175 6 5 0.06 0.08 0.08
We present in Table 3 the total number of users who saw screen 1 of a solici-
tation message, the number of contributors, as well as the contribution rate for the
2004 and 2005 campaigns for each mechanism, as well as the overall contribution
rate after combining the two campaigns (last column). The top panel includes all
data from 2004 (2004All) and 2005, while the lower panel includes the 2004 data
after the November 10 redesign (2004Red) and all of the 2005 data. As nearly 90%
of the users ignored the postal code pop-up window in 2004, an overwhelming num-
ber of users were directed to VCM until we revised the design mid-way through the
campaign. In comparison, in 2005, the number of users directed to each mechanism
roughly follow a uniform distribution. Overall, the contribution rate was quite low,
with only one out of every 6,252 users who saw a campaign message making a con-
tribution.16 The contribution rate does appear to vary across mechanisms, however;
we now turn to a statistical analysis of these data.
Result 1 (Contribution Rate) Using all contribution data, the Premium mecha-
nism generates significantly higher contribution rate than VCM. None of the other
pairwise comparisons between mechanisms is significant.
Support 1 In Table 3 we present the alternative hypotheses and the p-values for
the two-sample Fisher exact tests for the 2004 (all data and post redesign), 2005 as
well as the combined campaigns. The null hypothesis is that the contribution rates
16A direct mail field experiment on nonprofit fundraising achieved about a 1% contribution rate
(Katzev 1995). According to the Direct Marketing Association, average response rates to direct
mail fundraising campaigns are about 4.5% (Zeller and Chernis 2004). List and Lucking-Reiley
(2002) obtained about a 6% contribution rate. One problem with our contribution statistics is that
many users of IPL are youth, and only users over the age of 18 were permitted to make donations.
More generally, we have not found reliable estimates of typical donation rates for online nonprofit
campaigns against which to compare our results.
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Table 4: P-values for Two-sample Fisher Exact Tests of Equality of Contribu-
tion Rates
Alternative Hypothesis 2004All 2004Red 2005 CombinedAll CombinedRed
VCM < Premium 0.06 0.82 0.75 0.03 0.78
VCM < Seed 0.43 0.82 0.26 0.30 0.78
VCM < Matching 0.42 0.95 0.49 0.11 0.78
Seed 6= Premium 0.37 1.00 1.00 0.45 1.00
Matching 6= Premium 0.36 0.49 0.62 0.72 1.00
Seed 6= Matching 1.00 0.49 0.62 1.00 1.00
Note: The p-values in the first three rows are calculated for one-sided alternative
hypotheses, while those in the last three rows are calculated for two-sided alternative
hypotheses.
under each pair of mechanisms are equal. For the combined data set, contribution
rate under VCM < Premium at a p-value of 0.03. None of the other pairwise
comparisons is significant at the 5-percent level.
As we discussed in Section 2, when we use all data, results might be subject to
a sample selection bias. When restricted to post-redesign data, we can not reject
the null hypotheses that contribution rate is equal between any pair of mechanisms.
When each campaign is analyzed separately, the Premium mechanism generates a
(weakly) significantly higher contribution rate than the VCM (p = 0.06) in 2004
using all data. The Fisher exact tests can not reject null hypotheses that any other
pairs of mechanisms yield the same contribution rate. In campaign 2005, we can
not reject the null hypotheses that contribution rate is equal between any pair of
mechanisms, primarily because the sample of contributors is very small.
We report the number of contributions, total contribution, and average gift size
under each mechanism in Table 3. Again, the top panel presents all data, while the
bottom panel presents data after the redesign. The last two columns present the al-
ternative hypotheses and the corresponding p-values from the two-sample Wilcoxon
rank sum test on the gift size between pairs of mechanisms. We pool data from the
two campaigns. Because of the skewed distribution of traffic in 2004, VCM gen-
erates the highest total dollar contribution. Partly due to the small sample size for
each mechanism, the Wilcoxon rank sum tests can not reject the null hypotheses
that any pair of mechanisms yield the same gift size conditional on giving.
Result 2 (Gift Size) There is no significant difference between any pair of mecha-
nisms in the gift sizes they generate.
Support 2 In Table 3 we present the alternative hypotheses and the corresponding
p-values from the two-sample Wilcoxon rank sum test on the gift size between pairs
of mechanisms. None of the pairwise comparisons is significant at the 5-percent
level.
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Table 5: Gift Size: Two-sample Wilcoxon rank sum test on the gift size between
pairs of mechanisms
All Data # Contr. Tot. Contr. Mean Gift Size H1 p-value
VCM 15 $805 $53.67 VCM < Premium 0.92
Premium 4 $120 $30.00 VCM < Seed 0.88
Seed 2 $50 $25.00 VCM < Matching 0.55
Matching 3 $153 $51.00 Premium 6= Seed 1.00
Matching 6= Premium 0.59
Total 24 $1,128 $47.00 Matching 6= Seed 0.55
Post Red. # Contr. Tot. Contr. Mean Gift Size H1 p-value
VCM 5 $250 $50.00 VCM < Premium 0.83
Premium 2 $75 $37.50 VCM < Seed 0.33
Seed 2 $50 $25.00 VCM < Matching 0.31
Matching 2 $150 $75.00 Premium 6= Seed 0.32
Matching 6= Premium 0.22
Total 11 $525 $47.73 Matching 6= Seed 0.10
Result 2 may well be due to the fact that the number of contributions is very
small under each mechanism. Both List and Lucking-Reiley (2002) and Rondeau
and List (2005) found that the Seed mechanism generated significantly larger gift
than VCM in a conventional mail campaign.
We now turn to user click behavior. Web communications are based on a client-
server. The user is the client, and uses client software (a “browser”) to send mes-
sages (in the HTTP protocol, or language) to a server, which is a software program
usually running on a different computer that responds to the messages by returning
information stored on that computer. For example, each time a user clicks on a link
(or button or image, etc.) displayed by a browser, the browser sends a message to
the Web server indicating that the user clicked that token and requesting that the
server respond in the appropriate way. Thus, a “click” is a conscious behavior by a
user to make a request or signal an action to a server. Further, the server observes
the clicks, and can record the sequence of clicks and the semantic meaning associ-
ated with them (for example, “display additional information” or “start the donation
process”). Clickstream data is a major new source of observable user behavior, and
researchers (as well as marketing departments) actively collect and try to interpret
user preferences and intentions from their click sequences.
As an example of the opportunities afforded by clickstream data, consider us-
age of scholarly (or other) publications: when journals are printed on paper and
shelved in a library, it is extremely difficult for a publisher to determine which
articles are in fact being viewed, and by whom. When articles are published elec-
tronically and accessed from a publisher’s server, such as Elsevier’s ScienceDirect
(http://www.sciencedirect.com), the publisher can measure viewing with much less
noise.
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However, although clickstream data clearly reveals certain choices made by
users, inferences about user preferences or intentions may be difficult. In the elec-
tronic publishing example, although clicking to display a journal article on one’s
screen is probably a fairly accurate measure of whether something about that article
was viewed, it may be a much less accurate measure of whether, or how much of
that article was read. Perhaps the title was catchy but the user realized from the
abstract that the article was not of interest to her. We now discuss some of the user
clickstream data we collected, and our findings about the caution that field experi-
ments must employ when interpreting clickstream data.
In both campaigns, we were able to track user click data until the user departed
from IPL by closing the browser window, going to a different website, or by clicking
on the final step in our campaign system: the “Contribute now” button. Recall
that the donation process is not complete when a user clicks “Contribute now”;
rather, the user then is delivered to the University Giving page, where donations
are actually processed by filling out a set of forms. In Table 3 we present the
total number of users who saw screen 1 of a solicitation message, the number of
users who clicked all the way through the “Contribute now” link, and the calculated
click-through rates for the separate and pooled 2004 and 2005 campaigns. Both
campaigns 2004 and 2005 yielded a consistent pattern with respect to the ranking
of the click-through rates among the four mechanisms.
Table 6: Clicking “Contribute Now” Rate Across Mechanisms
Mechanism #Users saw screen 1 # Clickers on Clicking Rate (%)
“Contribute now”
All Data 2004All 2005 2004All 2005 2004All 2005 Comb.
VCM 122,573 1,564 250 57 0.20 3.64 0.25
Premium 6,921 1,568 7 33 0.10 2.10 0.47
Seed 7,090 1,529 26 51 0.37 3.34 0.89
Matching 7,281 1,514 28 51 0.38 3.37 0.90
Total 143,865 6,175 311 192 0.22 3.11 0.34
Post Red. 2004Red 2005 2004Red 2005 2004Red 2005 Comb.
VCM 2,269 1,564 4 57 0.18 3.64 1.59
Premium 2,304 1,568 1 33 0.04 2.10 0.88
Seed 2,322 1,529 4 51 0.17 3.34 1.43
Matching 2,423 1,514 6 51 0.25 3.37 1.45
Total 9,318 6,175 15 192 0.16 3.11 1.34
Result 3 (Click-through Rate) Using all data, the Premium, Seed and Matching
mechanisms each generate significantly higher rate of clicking through the “Con-
tribute now” link than the VCM mechanism, while the Seed and Matching mecha-
nisms each generate significantly higher rate of clicking through than the Premium
mechanism. The latter holds when we restrict the sample to post redesign data.
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Table 7: Clicking “Contribute Now”: P-values for Two-sample Fisher Exact
Tests
Alternative Hypothesis 2004All 2004Red 2005 CombinedAll CombinedRed
VCM<Premium 0.97 0.82 0.99 0.00 1.00
VCM < Seed 0.01 0.62 0.64 0.00 0.69
VCM<Matching 0.00 0.42 0.62 0.00 0.66
Seed 6= Premium 0.00 0.37 0.04 0.00 0.03
Matching 6= Premium 0.00 0.13 0.04 0.00 0.02
Seed 6= Matching 0.89 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00
Support 3 We present in Table 3 the alternative hypotheses and the p-values for
the two-sample Fisher exact tests of equality of proportions for the 2004, 2005
as well as the combined campaigns. The null hypothesis is that the click-through
rates under each pair of mechanisms are equal. For the combined data set, click-
through rate under VCM < Premium, VCM < Seed, VCM < Matching, Premium
6= Seed, and Premium 6= Matching at a p-value of 0.00 respectively. None of the
other pairwise comparisons is significant at the 5% level. Restricting the sample to
post redesign data, we get Premium 6= Seed at a p-value of 0.03, and Premium 6=
Matching at a p-value of 0.02.
Result 3 indicates that the click-through rate is significantly higher under the
Seed and Matching mechanism than under the VCM and Premium mechanisms.
For the combined data, the click-through rate under Premium is significantly higher
than under VCM. Meanwhile, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the click-
through rate under Seed and Matching is the same. This result holds separately for
the 2004 campaign, and generally holds separately for the 2005 campaign as well.
Comparing the click-through rates of 2004 and 2005, we note that, under each
mechanism, the rates are much higher in 2005 (p < 0.01 for every pairwise com-
parison between 2004 and 2005). This might be due to the fact that in the 2005
campaign only those users who affirmatively clicked on the side bar “Give to IPL”
button were shown the message; in 2004 all users were shown a pop-under window
with the campaign message (if they did not have a pop-up blocker running). There-
fore, 2005 participants who saw screen 1 were more active or curious than the 2004
users who might have seen screen 1 passively.
We are aware of no theoretical results that consider why one contribution mech-
anism might consistently draw more curiosity than another. To the extent that cu-
riosity is a driving factor for our result, we find it somewhat surprising that partici-
pants were more inclined to click through for the Seed and Matching messages than
for the Premium message. The Premium treatment is the only one that promised a
direct private incentive for donating, and our prior was that, if anything, the chance
to obtain some premium item would stimulate more curiosity. Since we cannot
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distinguish between the actual contribution rates or gift sizes for Premium, Seed
and Matching, we do not offer concrete advice on this issue for fundraisers, but the
possibility of a “curiosity” difference between mechanisms merits further research.
4 Discussion: Online Experiment Methodology
We set out, in part, to develop methods for embedded online field experiments. By
“embedded” we mean experiments that are run within production online services,
not set up as stand-alone experiments that happen to use the Internet as a commu-
nications medium. There have been a number of stand-alone experiments that have
used the Internet as a medium (Lucking-Reiley (1999) is one of the early, better
known examples); there have been fewer attempts to embed experiments in produc-
tion environments. In this section we summarize several lessons we learned about
embedded online experimental design.
4.1 Subject identification / authentication
One important challenge for any online experiment is to ensure that each user only
sees one mechanism. This is especially likely to be difficult for embedded experi-
ments, since many information services do not use an identification / authentication
system (such as login plus password). Indeed, in our case users do not need to log
in to get access to the IPL. We used cookie technology to create unique, persistent
identifiers to trace users, solely for the purpose of ensuring that on each return visit
they see the same fund-raising mechanism.
Our method is not failsafe, however. We are aware of at least three failure
modes. First, some users configure their browsers to block cookies. We dealt with
this problem by assigning such users to a single mechanism (the control, VCM)
which ensures consistency but is a source of potential unbalancing of our control
sample.
Second, the cookie originally written on a participant’s machine may be inten-
tionally or inadvertently deleted by the participant before a return visit to IPL. We
have no way to identify such instances: when we look for a cookie and don’t find
one, we assume the user is making her first visit to IPL since the start of the cam-
paign, and we assign her to a treatment — but quite possibly a different treatment
than the last time she visited.
Yet a third failure mode is that the participant might visit the IPL from more
than one client computer. Since cookies are stored on the local client computer,
we would not find the cookie if the user made a subsequent visit from a different
computer, and we would again treat the user as a first-time visitor and assign a —
possibly different — treatment.
We considered an alternative to cookies which has some advantages, but we
concluded that on balance it was inferior: identify users by the IP address of the
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computer they use to connect to IPL. The advantage is that the user cannot easily
block the IP address from being read by our software. For machines with so-called
“static” IP addresses, the user cannot easily delete or change the IP address before
a subsequent visit. However, many machines are configured with “dynamic” IP
addresses which can change relatively frequently. Other machines are located be-
hind a firewall, and the IP address that they “publish” is actually the address of the
firewall, and may represent a few to thousands of different machines. Likewise, a
single machine may be used by multiple different users, who would then all have
the same IP address.
Perhaps the most reliable method for identification and authentication at rea-
sonable cost is to use a login plus password system. It is relatively simple for the
experimenter to install such a system for an embedded experiment if the informa-
tion service does not already use such a system. However, as we found in our IPL
experiment, the service provider might be unwilling to allow the experimenter to
implement a login system because it rather seriously changes the user experience
of the service, and generally for the worse. Field experiment evidence suggests that
such fears are well-founded: login plus password systems may impose substan-
tial non-pecuniary user costs and have marked negative effects on usage; see the
discussion in subsection 4.4 below.
A related design solution would be to choose as a host for the experiment an
information service that already uses a login plus password system. However, this
may not be feasible, or may rule out especially attractive opportunities, but the
experimental results may not generalize well to the greater number of information
services that do not require login authentication, especially given the evidence that
the non-pecuniary user costs of login systems may be quite high.17
It may also be worth noting that no standard method of identification and au-
thentication for experiments implement in other environments — e.g, mail, phone
or laboratory campaigns — is proof against a participant repeating the experiment
under a different identity. The problems seem to be more numerous and harder to
solve for online experiments, but it is unreasonable to expect that any system will
be perfect.
4.2 Balanced assignment to control and treatment groups
It is often important to gather information about experimental subjects in order to
assign them to control and treatment groups in a way that balances the distribution
of various characteristics, in order to control for spurious correlations and to render
the results generalizable. Balanced assignment of subjects to groups can be more
challenging for experiments conducted on the Internet than those conducted in the
17Of course, login plus password systems are not failsafe either; there are several failure modes.
Discussing them in detail is beyond the scope of this article. In short, they are similar to, but
generally less severe than the failure modes for cookies.
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brick-and-mortar world. As we discussed above, the experimenter may be able to
obtain little or no information identifying the individual subjects. Service providers
hosting embedded experiments may not be willing to let experimenters mandate
standard demographic pre-tests due to the adverse impact on user experience.
As described in Section 2.1.1 above, we used the web technology for generat-
ing pop-up windows to implement a simple method for balancing subject assign-
ment. Our method imposed minimal cost on potential participants (they were asked
merely to enter three digits and make one click), and was not privacy-invasive (no
individual identifying information can be gleaned from only the first three digits of
a postal code).
There are three main failure modes for our method. First, users could simply
ignore the popup window, closing it without entering any information. Second, the
pop-up window could be blocked altogether (so it was not even displayed) using
pop-up blocking software that at that time had become a well-known feature for
some browsers, and add-in available for others. Finally, the participant could enter
three digits of a valid postal code, but they might not be the participant’s true postal
code, resulting in (possible) mis-assignment.
Out of the 155,591 users tracked by our program in the 2004 campaign (when
we used the pop-up method), 138,694 users (89.14%) did not enter anything in the
postal code window. The lack of entry could be due to either the use of a pop-
up blocker, or user unwillingness to enter the digits. We are unable to distinguish
between these two failure modes in our data.
In the 2004 campaign 683 users (0.44%) entered invalid U.S. or Canadian postal
code digits. This number probably does not indicate very many (intentional or
unintentional) errors because we recorded a valid postal code from another country
as invalid, and IPL receives a sizable number of visitors from outside of North
America (indeed, two of the 24 contributors were from Germany and one from
Egypt.).
Only 16,214 users (10.42%) entered a valid U.S. or Canadian postal code. Of
these, some unknown fraction, while valid, may not have been the participant’s true
postal code. For users from the U.S. who actually made a donation, we are able to
compare the mechanism under which they made the contribution with the mecha-
nism that should have been assigned to them had they entered their true postal code
information, since the true code is generally recorded in the contribution dataset.18
Surprisingly, among the sixteen users from the U.S. who contributed in 2004, ten
of them came from a different mechanism from the one that should have been as-
signed had they entered the true information in the postal code pop-up window. We
conjecture that one reason for the very high rate of non-compliance with our request
18Donors must provide a valid address to authenticate their credit card, and are asked to provide
an address for a follow-up if they are making a check donation. Though the user could like in the
latter case, this seems unlikely since the user has already decided to make a donation, and generally
will give up address information by sending a check in any case.
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for the first three digits of postal codes may have been that users perceived there to
be some non-negligible risk that this information could be used to identify them or
otherwise invade their privacy.
We conclude that our pop-up window method for obtaining the geographic in-
formation needed to implement demographic balancing proved ineffective. In the
2005 campaign we relied solely on randomization to balance our samples.
4.3 Interpreting clickstream behavior
Since the emergence of the World Wide Web as a widespread phenomenon in 1994,
many researchers have mined the server logs from web sites for “clickstream” data,
and then tried to draw inferences from the clicks users make (that is, the affirmative
choices to navigate to different locations, or to initiate some other action, such as
processing a form input). In economic jargon, since clicking is an affirmative action,
it reveals preference, and it might be possible to draw inferences from participants’
revealed preferences. However, the experimenter must interpret for what the user
has revealed a preference. Our data tell a cautionary tale on the interpretation of
clickstream data.
One of the critical steps in our contribution solicitation was a link that an inter-
ested participant would reach that was labeled “Contribute now”. Generally, only
by clicking this link would a participant reach the University Giving online system
through which she could process a donation.19 What our data reveal,however, is
that clicking “Contribute now” more often than not did not mean the participant
would make a donation.
In particular, we observed dramatically higher rates of clicking “Contribute
now” than the rate of actually contributing across all mechanisms. In campaign
2004, only 6.1% of users who clicked through the “Contribute now” link actually
contributed. The rate in campaign 2005 was 2.6%. Across both campaigns the
percentage was 4.8%. The differences are statistically significant for each mech-
anism separately by campaign, and pooled across campaigns (p < 0.01 for both
one-tailed and two-tailed Fisher exact tests for all mechanisms by campaign and
pooled campaign, except in Premium 2004All where the one-tailed p-value is 0.17
and the two-tailed is 0.34, and all mechanisms in 2004Red).
That is, whatever preference the participant was revealing by clicking “Con-
tribute now”, it apparently was not often a preference actually to donate. We con-
clude that great caution is required in interpreting clickstream data.
19There are other ways to reach the University Giving system, but none were identified in the IPL
website, so a user would have to have other knowledge about how to get around the “Contribute
now” link. In any case, if any participant did find different means to get to the University Giving
system, the resulting donation would not be recorded as associated with our campaign.
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4.4 Interface design
We noted above that only 5.2% of participants who affirmatively clicked on the
“Contribute now” in fact completed a contribution. One possible explanation is that
the design of the University Giving system interface, for example, the number of
screens, length of forms, etc., imposes non-negligible cost that discourages partic-
ipants from completing a donation that they did intend to make. We call this an
“interface cost” effect.
Our pretesting indicated that, after users clicked “Contribute now” and entered
the University Giving page, it took five to six minutes on average for someone who
was fairly familiar with the giving system to complete the entire contribution pro-
cess. In a field experiment on pricing online access to scholarly journals, Gazzale
and MacKie-Mason (Forthcoming 2006) found that non-pecuniary user costs (such
as the inconvenience of obtaining a free password and using it) decreased purchases
of $7 articles by as much as 90%.
An alternative hypothesis is that many participants simply wanted to satisfy their
curiosity about what would happen when they clicked “Contribute now”, but they
never intended to actually contribute: we call this the curiosity effect.
In our present experiment, since we were unable to instrument the participant’s
interaction with the University Giving system, we have no observational evidence to
measure the relative importance of the curiosity and interface cost effects. However,
taken together with Gazzale and MacKie-Mason (Forthcoming 2006), we view the
result as a strong hint that fundraisers should devote considerable attention to non-
pecuniary users costs when designing their giving systems.
5 Conclusion
We set out with a dual agenda: to test various fund-raising mechanisms for public
goods, and to develop and evaluate methods for conducting online field experiments
embedded in production services.
We are constrained by the small voluntary donation sample from obtaining sta-
tistically significant evidence on all of the mechanism design hypotheses for which
the experiment was designed. Our design was somewhat ambitious: we imple-
mented a control (VCM) and three treatments (Seed, Matching, Premium), and
thus needed a substantial number of observations in each cell. One suggestion
to researchers is to embed an experiment in a setting with a sufficient previously
demonstrated level of activity to support the design. For example, we implemented
a fund-raising campaign in a service with no track record for online fund-raising.
We conjectured, incorrectly, that given the strong reputation of the IPL and the very
high daily usage rate, we would obtain a reasonably large sample.20
20In fact, the IPL did try to implement one previous online fund-raising campaign, which also did
not obtain many donors, but that was more than five years ago, when the service was not as well
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Nonetheless, we did obtain significant evidence on several interesting questions.
First, when we use all the data, we find that the Premium mechanism increases
the fraction of participants who make a donation. This result, though, might be
subject to a sample selection bias. Second, the Seed and Matching mechanisms each
generated a higher rate of interest as measured by click-through to the “Contribute
now” page than the Premium mechanism. Our results on gift size were insignificant
due to the small sample sizes: we could not reject the null hypothesis that the gift
size was the same for every pairwise mechanism comparison at even the 10% level
of significance.
On our second goal of developing and evaluating methodology we learned sev-
eral valuable lessons (some from successes, some from failures). First, participant
identification and authentication, to ensure repeat visitors are presented with only
one treatment, is a thorny problem. We considered several methods and imple-
mented a relatively straightforward cookie tracking system that appeared to work
reasonably well, though it is known to have some weaknesses that cannot be over-
come. The most effective system with reasonable costs is login plus password,
but this is unlikely to be acceptable for embedded experiments unless the hosting
information service already uses such a system.
Second, our efforts to implement balanced assignment to control and treatment
groups were stymied. The common approach of requiring subjects to complete
a demographic survey before assignment will not be feasible in many production
environments.21 Our effort to obtain coarse granularity geographic information
(through partial postal codes) was rejected by over 80% of participants, possibly due
to (unwarranted) privacy concerns, so we had to fall back on pure randomization.
We also discovered strong evidence that care must be used when interpreting the
preferences revealed by clickstream behavior: only about 5% of participants who
clicked through “Contribute now” in fact made a contribution.
Our evidence on the final methodological concern is consistent with evidence
from other sources: the non-pecuniary user costs of poor interface design may sub-
stantially affect participant behavior. In our case, the complexity of the donation
forms may partly explain the rather low donation rate, particularly when compared
to the much higher rate of “Contribute now” click-through. Planning for and allay-
ing participant concerns about privacy invasion, even when unwarranted, may be
important to obtain participation and protocol compliance.
Our summary of the methodological lessons is simple: whether the features of
the online infrastructure are well suitable for the experimenter’s design needs should
enter as a nontrivial factor in the pre-experiment decision function. Particularly for
field experiments embedded in production services, it may be wise to seek a service
known and without the design support of a professional fund-raiser.
21One exception we have seen arises when experimental subjects are employees of the hosting
organization, and the hosts are willing to require the employees to provide demographic information
(Bulkley and Van Alstyne 2005).
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host with infrastructure that is already adapted to the experimenter’s needs, since
most production services will object to introducing intrusive new infrastructure to
instrument and control an experiment.
In short, the Internet offers wonderful opportunities to aggregate participants
and to implement computer-based experiments embedded in field production ser-
vices, but the available technologies also confront the experimenter with imper-
fectly resolvable challenges. We hope that lessons learned from this project will
help future embedded field experiments on the Internet.
Appendix A. Screen Shots
Figure 1: Campaign 2004: Postal Code Pop-Up Window and “Friends of the
IPL” Button on IPL Homepage
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Figure 2: Campaign 2005: “Make an Anniversary Donation” Button on IPL
Homepage and Horizontal Link on a IPL Subject Page
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Figure 3: Campaign 2005: Solicitation Message Screens 1 and 2
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Figure 4: Campaign 2005: Solicitation Message Screen 3 - University Giving
Page
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Appendix B. Solicitation Messages: Campaign 2004
We include the solicitation messages for Campaign 2004. Those for Campaign
2005 are identical except for the ending dates, and the header, which says “Won’t
you now become an IPL Friend by making a 10th Anniversary Celebration Contri-
bution?”
[VCM-screen 1]
Thank you for being an IPL user.
Won’t you now become an IPL Friend?
The IPL you use today began in 1995. It has been supported by hundreds of profes-
sional volunteers, faculty and students at the School of Information at the University
of Michigan, and generous gifts from forward-looking corporations and founda-
tions, in particular the Kellogg Foundation.
Now we ask you to show your support for the service you value and trust.
Become a member of our new IPL Friends group by making a contribution
today!
Our goal is to raise $20,000 by December 30, 2004, to cover a portion of the
annual operational costs of the IPL. Making a gift is easy, greatly needed and
appreciated, tax-deductible, and directly supports the IPL service you use. Let
us welcome you now as our newest IPL Friend!
NOTE: You must be 18 years of age or older to make a gift. How to become an IPL Friend
Contribute now
[VCM - screen 2]
Giving to the IPL is easy! As a part of the University of Michigan’s School of
Information, the University’s secure on-line giving service can be used. Please
make your gift by 12/30/04 to receive full tax-deductible benefits for 2004 · · ·
and to help us reach our goal of $20,000 for the IPL!
Gifts of any amount are welcome. Please consider a gift of $25, $50, $75, $100, or
$365.
Michigan residents are eligible for the State Tax Credit for contributing to the IPL.
For an explanation of the Michigan State Tax Credit, see
http://www.michigan.gov/treasury/.
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Ready to make your gift? Welcome IPL Friend!
NOTE: You must be 18 years of age or older to make a gift.
back Contribute now
[Premium-screen 1]
Thank you for being an IPL user.
Won’t you now become an IPL Friend?
The IPL you use today began in 1995. It has been supported by hundreds of profes-
sional volunteers, faculty and students at the School of Information at the University
of Michigan, and generous gifts from forward-looking corporations and founda-
tions, in particular the Kellogg Foundation.
Now we ask you to show your support for the service you value and trust.
Become a member of our new IPL Friends group by making a contribution
today!
Our goal is to raise $20,000 by December 30, 2004, to cover a portion of the
annual operational costs of the IPL. All Friends contributing $25 or more will
receive a special IPL thank you gift:
• IPL mouse pad ($25-$49)
• IPL book light flashlight ($50-$74)
• IPL CD case ($75 or above)
Making a gift is easy, greatly needed and appreciated, tax-deductible, and di-
rectly supports the IPL service you use. Let us welcome you now as our newest
IPL Friend!
NOTE: You must be 18 years of age or older to make a gift. How to become an IPL Friend
Contribute now
[Premium - screen 2]
Giving to the IPL is easy! As a part of the University of Michigan’s School of
Information, the University’s secure on-line giving service can be used. Please
make your gift by 12/30/04 to receive full tax-deductible benefits for 2004 · · ·
and to help us reach our goal of $20,000 for the IPL!
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Gifts of any amount are welcome. Please consider a gift of $25, $50, $75, $100, or
$365.
Michigan residents are eligible for the State Tax Credit for contributing to the IPL.
For an explanation of the Michigan State Tax Credit, see
http://www.michigan.gov/treasury/.
Ready to make your gift? Welcome IPL Friend!
NOTE: You must be 18 years of age or older to make a gift.
back Contribute now
[Seed-screen 1]
Thank you for being an IPL user.
Won’t you now become an IPL Friend?
The IPL you use today began in 1995. It has been supported by hundreds of profes-
sional volunteers, faculty and students at the School of Information at the University
of Michigan, and generous gifts from forward-looking corporations and founda-
tions, in particular the Kellogg Foundation.
Now we ask you to show your support for the service you value and trust.
Become a member of our new IPL Friends group by making a contribution
today!
Our goal is to raise $20,000 by December 30, 2004, to cover a portion of the
annual operational costs of the IPL. We’re already half way there with a gift
of $10,000! Won’t you help us with the final $10,000? Your gift in any amount
will make a big difference.
Making a gift is easy, greatly needed and appreciated, tax-deductible, and di-
rectly supports the IPL service you use. Let us welcome you now as our newest
IPL Friend!
NOTE: You must be 18 years of age or older to make a gift. How to become an IPL Friend
Contribute now
[Seed - screen 2]
Giving to the IPL is easy! As a part of the University of Michigan’s School of
Information, the University’s secure on-line giving service can be used. Please
make your gift by 12/30/04 to receive full tax-deductible benefits for 2004 · · ·
and to help us raise the remaining $10,000 of our $20,000 goal.
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Gifts of any amount are welcome. Please consider a gift of $25, $50, $75, $100, or
$365.
Michigan residents are eligible for the State Tax Credit for contributing to the IPL.
For an explanation of the Michigan State Tax Credit, see
http://www.michigan.gov/treasury/.
Ready to make your gift? Welcome IPL Friend!
NOTE: You must be 18 years of age or older to make a gift.
back Contribute now
[Matching-screen 1]
Thank you for being an IPL user.
Won’t you now become an IPL Friend?
The IPL you use today began in 1995. It has been supported by hundreds of profes-
sional volunteers, faculty and students at the School of Information at the University
of Michigan, and generous gifts from forward-looking corporations and founda-
tions, in particular the Kellogg Foundation.
Now we ask you to show your support for the service you value and trust.
Become a member of our new IPL Friends group by making a contribution
today!
Our goal is to raise $20,000 by December 30, 2004, to cover a portion of the
annual operational costs of the IPL. To help us get there, an anonymous donor
has agreed to match contributions, $1 for $1, up to a total of $10,000. Double
the impact of your gift and join the IPL Friends today!
Making a gift is easy, greatly needed and appreciated, tax-deductible, and di-
rectly supports the IPL service you use. Let us welcome you now as our newest
IPL Friend!
NOTE: You must be 18 years of age or older to make a gift. How to become an IPL Friend
Contribute now
[Matching - screen 2]
Giving to the IPL is easy! As a part of the University of Michigan’s School of
Information, the University’s secure on-line giving service can be used. Please
make your gift by 12/30/04 to receive full tax-deductible benefits for 2004 · · ·
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and to have your gift matched, $1 for $1, with money from the matching gift
fund. With your help we’ll meet our $20,000 goal in record time.
Gifts of any amount are welcome. Please consider a gift of $25, $50, $75, $100, or
$365.
Michigan residents are eligible for the State Tax Credit for contributing to the IPL.
For an explanation of the Michigan State Tax Credit, see
http://www.michigan.gov/treasury/.
Ready to make your gift? Welcome IPL Friend!
NOTE: You must be 18 years of age or older to make a gift.
back Contribute now
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